statement by Thomas Kuhn in a collection titled American Philosophers (Borradori 1994: 157) : "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is addressed to philosophical readers . . . . Today I would consider it part of a discipline that at that time did not even exist: the sociology of knowledge." While sociologists might have a hard time agreeing with Kuhn's self-evaluation, his statement does foretell that scholars engaged in philosophical questions could from then on be found in various places on a university campus other than the philosophy department. The development of STS in Taiwan has likewise kindled new interest in philosophical reflections on technoscience; sociologists, historians, informaticians, psychiatrists, and even practicing engineers have become interested in the ontological, epistemological, and political-philosophical aspects of technoscience. One salient feature of the Taiwanese STS community is the active participation of practitioners from the fields of medicine, science, and engineering. Quite a few practitioners have found philosophy useful in the real-world issues that concern them. I know that Professor Chen would protest at this point, saying, "But they are interested only in the kind of philosophy that is close to and even connected with STS." If Professor Chen does indeed feel this way, as he has said in past e-mail exchanges with me, this protest can help us specify the real nature of the challenge. As such, STS does not constitute a challenge to philosophy of science in general, but only to certain specific traditions within philosophy of science. In my eyes, it would be more effective and helpful if Professor Chen could first identify those traditions that he views as being underappreciated by the Taiwanese STS community, and then elaborate on their contributions to our understanding of technoscience.
I very much welcome almost all of the reform efforts that Professor Chen has encouraged his colleagues to take on, especially his call for a closer interaction between philosophy of science, ethics, social philosophy, and practical philosophy. Nevertheless, I cannot help but wonder why Professor Chen emphasizes in the end that "PS [philosophy of science] is needed to provide general knowledge and a scientific image of science as a whole for the public." To say the least, this idea requires additional elaboration if we are to take it as the central mission for philosophy of science. As it stands, this assertion seems to have emerged out of nowhere and contradicts much of the recent scholarship in STS and history of science, which emphasizes the heterogeneity and disunity within technoscience. In my opinion, it would be more productive to engage in philosophical debates whenever particular aspects of the image of science are at stake, whether in the real world or in academia, than to construct such a general, even "scientific," image of science "as a whole." As a scholar focusing on the modern history and contemporary development of traditional East Asian medicine, I personally have found on numerous occasions that my actors were consciously engaged in philosophical reasoning and eagerly looking for inspiration from professional scholarship. Threatened by the positivist philosophy of science from the late nineteenth century on, advocates as well as reformers of traditional medicine, for example, were eager to learn from STS such concepts as the critique of the correspondence theory of truth, the practice theory of science, and the historical epistemology of objectivity, to name just a few. It is no accident that Andrew Pickering's publication of the edited volume Science as Practice and Culture (Pickering 1992) roughly coincided with the publication of the groundbreaking book Knowing Practice (Farquhar 1994) by the medical anthropologist Judith Farquhar, in which she characterized Chinese medicine as a system of practice. Breaking with the conventional, and general, image of science, both of these scholars strove to develop an alternative to the traditional view of science as knowledge and representation. If philosophy is to be the weapon of the weak, the general image of science is hardly the best candidate to serve this liberating function.
